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Abstract: This study has a two-fold purpose. First, it seeks to deter-
mine the importance of financial accounting information to railroad 
investors (and speculators) in 1880s America. Second, a further 
goal is to ascertain what financial accounting information was read-
ily available for use by these investors. Based on a comprehensive 
search of books of the era, the 1880s were a time of expanding advice 
for railroad securities holders that required the use of financial ac-
counting information. Furthermore, new information sources arose 
to help service investors’ needs. Statistics by Goodsell and The Wall 
Street Journal were two such sources. This article reviews these pub-
lications along with the ongoing Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
and Poor’s Manual of the Railroads of the United States. Each of these 
sources helped railroad investors to follow contemporary advice of 
gathering financial accounting and other information when investing.
INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the importance of financial ac-
counting to railroad investing in 1880s America. It examines 
railroad investors’ information wants as depicted in books and 
the availability of information in financial periodicals. Hence, it 
enhances understanding of the evolution of financial accounting 
and its role in investing in railroad securities.
Financial accounting became important to railroad invest-
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ing in the late 1840s and 1850s as railroads came to rely on 
securities markets as a source of capital. Initially, periodicals 
and railroad manuals supplied some rudimentary informa-
tion to security market participants. In the 1870s, information 
increased in depth and frequency. Poor’s Manual became more 
comprehensive while Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine published 
weekly instead of monthly [Thompson, 2008, 2011].
This research examines stock market advice and sources 
of information in the 1880s. Authors expanded their advice, 
some of which is still with us today. Financial information on 
railroads proliferated. Poor’s Manual and the Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle and Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine (Chronicle) 
extended their coverage. Statistics [Goodsell, 1883], primarily a 
railroad manual, began publication as did The Wall Street Jour-
nal as a daily business newspaper.
 To carry out this research, relevant books and serial pub-
lications were identified from WorldCat [2007 - 2010] using a 
comprehensive list of stock and bond market terms. Search-
ing was not restricted to railroad securities, but invariably the 
sources dealt with railroads, the dominant business of the day. 
Included are American publications obtainable via interlibrary 
loan about the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or general 
works on investing and speculation. Excluded are regional and 
legal publications.
The method employed herein differs from that used by oth-
ers in studying the financial reporting of railroads in the nine-
teenth century. Some authors examined the annual reports of 
specific railroads to learn of financial reporting practices includ-
ing Boockholdt [1978], Previts and Samson [2000], and Flesher, 
Previts, and Samson [2006]. Other authors studied railroads in 
conjunction with a particular accounting issue such as capital-
ization versus expense [Brief, 1963], early auditing [Boockholdt, 
1983], income smoothing [Buckmaster, 1992], and depreciation 
[Heier, 2006]. Such studies emphasize a preparer’s perspective, 
focusing on descriptions and procedures in financial reports. 
This research emphasizes a user’s perspective, concentrating on 
what investors wanted to know and what information was avail-
able to them. It addresses financial reporting’s primary objective 
of providing information for investing (and creditor) decisions 
[Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2010].
Organization of this article is as follows. In the first section, 
I portray the securities markets of the 1880s, the backdrop for 
the study. In subsequent sections, I review the advice offered 
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to railroad investors and the contents of those informational 
sources. The conclusion places railroad investment practices of 
the 1880s in perspective.
RAILROADS AND THE SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE 
1880S
Railroads dominated the American economy in the 1880s. 
They grew tremendously, adding 73,000 miles of track, more 
than any other decade of the 19th century.1 In so doing, they 
helped spur the doubling, or nearly so, of coal and pig iron 
production and the tripling of iron ore shipments from 1879 to 
1890. By 1890, railroad revenues exceeded $1 billion compared 
with about $400 million income for the federal government. 
Railroad debt of $5.1 billion was almost five times that of the 
federal government [Platt, 1905; Garraty, 1995; Gordon, 2004].  
Railroads also dominated the securities markets. Table I 
shows that the number of railroad securities dwarfed most other 
types. Moreover, for the week ending July 12, 1889, for example, 
active railroad stocks accounted for 71% of the shares traded on 
the NYSE [Chronicle, 1889b].2  
Several events affected the securities markets in the 1880s. 
The most notable was the Grant & Ward panic of 1884.3 This 
incident illustrates that investors had to be wary of fraudulent 
manipulations. Ferdinand Ward conducted a Ponzi scheme that 
unraveled on May 6, 1884 when he could no longer raise funds 
to pay off old lenders who wanted their money back.4 Marine 
National Bank failed that same day as it had advanced over $4 
million to Grant & Ward. Other banks and brokerage firms fol-
lowed. Stock prices faltered. Six actively traded stocks declined 
more than 50 percent from their March 1884 highs to their June 
1  Much of the impetus for this new construction was competition among the 
railroads. After the failure of pooling agreements like that of Albert Fink’s Eastern 
Trunk Line Association, railroads resorted to building their own large indepen-
dent systems in order to ensure adequate traffic and rates [McCraw, 1984; Chan-
dler, 1977].
2  Trust stocks accounted for 25% of the trading volume with National Lead 
Trust accounting for 18% of the total volume. For the year 1889, overall trad-
ing volume on the NYSE was about 72 million, including 11 million for unlisted 
shares [Platt, 1905].
3  Although not as severe as the panics of 1873 and 1893, contemporary writ-
ers of the time [Clews, 1887; Stedman and Easton, 1905] considered 1884 a panic 
year.
4  Ponzi schemes remain common as demonstrated by Bernie Madoff and Al-
len Stanford [Waggoner, 2009; Associated Press, 2012].
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lows [Stedman and Easton, 1905]. Moreover, 51 of 54 stocks 
reported in the New York Times (NYT) on May 6 declined an 
average of nearly 30 percent by June 28 [NYT, 1884a, b]. Prices 
recovered somewhat in the second half of 1884 and even more 
so in the bull market of the following year as railroad earnings, 
prices of steel rails and coal, and retail trade all improved [Sted-
man and Easton, 1905].  
A significant event in 1885 was the beginning of the “un-
listed department” on the NYSE where shares of corporations 
TABLE I
Number of Security Quotations in the Chronicle
     Category Number Percentage
United States Bonds 9 .4
State Securities 85 3.6
City Securities 241 10.2
Railroad Bonds 1,023 43.2
Railroad Stocks 316 13.3
Canal Bonds 13 .6
Canal Stocks 5 .2
Miscellaneous Bonds 28 1.2
Miscellaneous Stocks 35 1.5
Coal & Mining Stocks 19 .8
Express Stocks 4 .2
Trust Stocks (pre-holding companies) 8 .3
Telegraph 16 .7
Telephone 8 .3
Electric Light Stocks 22 .9
Trust Companies (financial institutions) 19 .8
Gas Stocks 37 1.6
Mining Stocks (New York and San Francisco) 67 2.8
Boston Mining 16 .7
Manufacturing (mostly New England) 80 3.4
Bank Stocks 260 11.0
Fire Insurance Stocks 54 2.3
Marine Insurance Scrip 6 .3
     Totals 2,371 100.0*
     
     *rounded
Source: Chronicle [1889c]
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making manufactured products, eventually known as industri-
als, traded. Many of these industrials organized as trusts.5 The 
NYSE did not require financial information from these organi-
zations and they provided little information to their sharehold-
ers. This contributed to the prominence of railroads not only in 
financial publications, but also in the securities markets as well 
[Stedman and Easton, 1905; Navin and Sears, 1955; Hawkins, 
1968; Chandler, 1977].    
Another important event in the 1880s was the passage of the 
Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887. Through this Act, Congress 
reacted to the U. S. Supreme Court’s decision to overturn an Il-
linois law that prohibited the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Rail-
road from charging different rates for long versus short hauls. 
They ruled that Illinois could not regulate interstate commerce 
[Garraty, 1995].  
Provisions of the Act prohibited rebates, drawbacks, and 
traffic-sharing (pooling) agreements. Railroads had to publish 
their rates and could not change them without public notifica-
tion. The Act also created the first federal regulator, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC). Initially, the ICC had lim-
ited powers as they could not set rates, but only take railroads to 
court when they thought the rates unreasonable. Hence, it was 
not very effective in its early years [Merino and Coe, 1978; Gar-
raty, 1995].  
By this Act, Congress began the process of standardizing 
financial reporting by railroads. It required financial accounting 
information on capital stock, dividends, surplus, funded and 
floating debts, interest, property, franchises, equipment, salaries, 
improvements, earnings and receipts, operating and other ex-
penses, profit and loss balance, and financial operations includ-
ing a balance sheet. It also permitted development of a uniform 
system of accounts and methods [Forty-Ninth Congress of the 
United States of America, 1887]. While the type of required 
information was similar to that provided previously in railroad 
manuals for many years, railroads did not follow uniform pro-
cedures. The ICC’s attempt at uniformity in 1894, Classification 
of Operating Expenses, largely failed as both railroads and state 
railroad commissions resisted. Railroad accounting methods 
5  Trusts allowed their trustees to control corporations in multiple states. 
By the 1890s, about fifty trusts were in existence. However, when New Jersey’s 
1889 law allowed the formation of holding companies, trusts began to convert to 
that form. Most trusts converted in the early 1890s though Standard Oil, having 
started the trust organization in 1882, converted in 1899 [Navin and Sears, 1955; 
Geisst, 1997].
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were not standardized until the passage of the Hepburn Act in 
1906 [Baskin and Miranti, 1997; Heier, 2006].  
With respect to accounting standards, the accounting pro-
fession lacked sufficient influence to develop them in the 1880s.6 
As an example of the need for standards, replacement account-
ing for property and equipment provided wide discretion by rail-
road managers for capitalizing or expensing expenditures. This 
likely led to confusion for investors and speculators.7 Moreover, 
railroads often acted in their self-interest whether capitalizing 
assets to increase their base for rate setting or expensing costs to 
lessen income in order to avoid excess profit taxes [Brief, 1963; 
Boockholdt, 1978; Previts and Merino, 1998].
ADVICE FOR RAILROAD INVESTORS FROM THE 1880S
Clews [1887] stated that there were two controlling fac-
tors to the market – intrinsic and external.8 The intrinsic factor 
included the operations of cliques and large operators, the over-
bought or over-sold state of the market as reflected by the inter-
est rate on loans for stocks, influential stocks, margin amounts, 
and short sales. The external factor related to the general state 
of the country including crops, manufacturing, trade, trans-
portation companies’ earnings, imports and exports, appeal of 
securities in foreign countries, precious metals, money markets, 
laws, courts, labor, and political and social considerations. 
Hence, Clews recognized that railroad earnings mattered to the 
stock market.
Clews considered reasons for losses in speculation. Specula-
tors should not have [pp. 201-202] “any natural idiosyncrasies” 
such as extremes in terms of knowledge, boldness, confidence, 
action, self-esteem, or credulity. He added that “Many specula-
tors lose because the information on which they base their 
6  Public accounting began in America only in the early 1880s with the Ameri-
can Association of Public Accountants incorporating in 1887. However, bankers, 
lawyers, and executives did not generally recognize public accounting as a profes-
sion until after 1893 [Anyon, 1925a, b, c].    
7  Littleton [1933] noted that depreciation expense was not included in rail-
road reports submitted to the ICC in the late 1880s.
8  Henry Clews was a banker/broker on Wall Street, having joined the NYSE in 
the late 1850s. By 1887, he owned the Banking House of Henry Clews & Co that 
had offices opposite the NYSE and six branches in New York. His firm held mem-
berships in the NYSE, New York Produce Exchange, New York Cotton Exchange, 
New York Coffee Exchange, and the Chicago Board of Trade [Clews, 1887]. His 
book contained over 700 pages of his recollections of people and events in Wall 
Street.
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operations is insufficient; more because it is false; and others be-
cause, while their information is correct, they do not know how 
to turn it to account” (all italics are in the original text). Fur-
thermore, many lost because they did not take the time to find 
out the full story or because of faulty reporting in the financial 
press. Thus, Clews acknowledged the importance of complete 
and reliable information.  
Others essentially echoed Clews’ comments. The stock 
market participant of the 1880s had to be wary of manipula-
tors including directors of railroads that sometimes operated in 
their own best interests. For example, they might sell their own 
company’s stock short and then release statements belittling 
their railroad in order to drive the price of the stock down. Once 
driven down, they would cover their shorts and go long. Their 
assessment of the railroad then became positive, driving prices 
up [Swann, 1886].9
These traps often caught inexperienced stock traders. Many 
such novices bought high and sold low, leading to their dismal 
failures. Although forewarned, many such operators could not 
resist the temptation of possibly becoming rich quickly, using 
the stock market as a casino. This was possible by buying stock 
on margin of 10% of par value. Hence, $1,000 controlled 100 
shares of $100 par value stock. An increase in the market value 
of the stock of $10 per share generated $1,000 in profit and dou-
bling one’s initial investment, not counting brokerage commis-
sions and interest.   
Despite the dangers of manipulation and the excitement 
of a casino, some writers of the time considered earnings, divi-
dends, and other information valuable in investment decisions.10 
Recipes for success included information along with advice such 
as buying after a panic and selling while prices were high, using 
high margins, not trading too often, and being aware of railroad 
rate wars and competition. For example, Davis & Co. [1888, pp. 
52-53] commented that when assessing a stock:
A more vital question is whether the condition of the 
9  Stock manipulators still exist. Recently the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission suspended the trading of 379 over-the-counter stocks because of the 
probability of “pump-and-dump schemes.” In these schemes, the stockowners use 
press releases to tout the prospects of their companies enticing gullible investors 
to buy the stock. Once the price has risen sufficiently, the original owners sell their 
stock at a profit. These schemes succeed because the companies do not provide 
any financial information [Krantz, 2012].
10  As will be discussed in conjunction with Poor’s Manual, by 1889 most rail-
roads provided earnings (operations data).  Industrials did not usually do so.
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property, its freedom from disastrous competition, the 
permanence of its earning capacity, the cost of its oper-
ations, the proportion of fixed charges to net earnings, 
the character of its officers and management, the prior-
ity of obligations, the facility or the difficulty of enforc-
ing the rights of the security holders, etc., are all such 
that the investor may count upon continued satisfaction 
and profit.
Swann [1886, p. 79] added that while some debt helped, “A railroad 
which is hopelessly overburthened (sic) must some day or other 
face the axioms of the multiplication-table, and recognize that two 
and two make four, and not five.” Such railroads likely struggled 
and “tempted to disguise to a greater or less extent its floating debt, 
and to ignore engagements on paper which have not matured.” 
Hence, both Davis & Co. and Swann recognized the vital impor-
tance of accounting data in assessing companies for investment. 
Noteworthy, Davis’s “earning capacity” currently corresponds with 
future earnings analysis and the relationship of fixed charges to net 
earnings essentially mirrors a margin of safety analysis. 
One author [Anonymous, 1881] gave the following rules:  
• Buy stocks once a year; sell them once a year.  
• Buy when the market has decreased.  
• Do not operate for a decline.  
• Patiently wait for a decline in stocks and hold stocks  
 once purchased.  
• Know what you are buying.  
• “Property that is not open to the ready inspection of 
 all is the best property in the world to let alone.” [p.  
 64]
In the latter case, the author emphasized having readily assess-
able information.
Samson [1884, pp. 150, 153-154] advised, “Get all possible 
information but do not borrow judgment” and buy dividend 
paying stock as “any business enterprise which earns a net profit 
is worthy of more confidence than one which does not.” In con-
trast, “Fancy, or non-dividend paying stocks, often times pay a 
large profit, it is true, but they are subject to violent fluctuation.” 
Smith [1887] also recommended being an investor for dividend 
income. He considered crops and their potential for export, 
export and import of gold, railway earnings and changes, and 
railroad conflicts. Note that both Samson and Smith considered 
8
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earnings important when selecting investments.
Dando [1885] advised ascertaining the highest and lowest 
price of a stock during the last three years. Next, he determined 
the dividends that had been paid [pp. 63-64] “and, as far as 
possible, the present earning capacity and condition of the 
properties.” The author suggested buying the stock at three or 
four percent less than its middle value over the last three years. 
If prices fall, buy more stock: “This system is termed averaging, 
and is adopted universally by the most distinguished financiers.” 
He sold when the stock price reached three percent above the 
middle value. Such an “averaging down” strategy endures on 
Wall Street [Downes and Goodman, 1991].
Dando illustrated operating for a fall using Lake Shore 
stock [pp. 68 and 70]: 
Looking at the condition of the road at that period, the 
traffic receipts and expenses for a few months previ-
ously, and having regard to the fact that the Stock had 
risen seventeen per cent., it would have appeared a safe 
sale for a reaction of at least three or four per cent. 
Conversely, operating for a rise was also possible: “As a rule, 
a fall of ten or fifteen per cent. is followed by a sharp rally; 
through which moderate profits can be secured by an opera-
tor.” One must try to find the causes of the fall such as “traffic 
receipts and expenditures, and the condition of trade gener-
ally.” Among his rules he included [pp. 118 – 121] “Sound and 
reliable information should be sought after,” but “Information 
volunteered, should be received with reserve.” In modern terms, 
Dando’s strategy combined technical analysis and fundamental 
analysis, with earnings capacity, traffic receipts, and expenses 
playing a prominent role.  
As for the prospects for the stock market, Kosboth [1880], 
in his solicitation of investors for his mutual fund, thought that 
prices would go higher and that it was the best time to invest 
since prior to the panic of 1873. He expected a record grain crop 
and increases in manufacturing, merchandise sales, and immi-
gration resulting in “unparalleled earnings” for the railroads in 
1880. Obviously, Kosboth considered earnings a key to invest-
ment. He also advised that [p. 7] “an operator in stocks and 
bonds will be safe upon every good fair decline in prices, in pur-
chasing the securities of our good steady dividend paying roads, 
or those that have recently entered the dividend lists.”11
11  As it turned out, stock prices did improve in 1880.  In a study of the prices 
9
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Interestingly, Cramer & Co. [1881, p. 13] emphasized that 
large price changes are advantageous as “Profits are made when 
fluctuations occur in the market.” Cramer & Co. explained that 
price declines were due to events such as the assassination of 
the President, bank failures, and stringency in the money mar-
ket. Price increases were caused by events such as declaration 
of dividends, advantageous railroad combinations, election of 
“strong men to Directorships,” “large reported earnings,” good 
crop reports, and the United States’ government purchasing 
bonds. Again, accounting earnings played an important part of 
successful investing.
Ross [1888, pp. 60-62] commented that “The successful op-
erator requires a mind of crystal, a heart of adamant, and a will 
of iron; these, when combined with a mind indifferent to the ru-
mor of the gossipmongers, or to the temporary shrinkage of the 
price of securities, will bring safety and profit.” Operators suc-
ceeded by gathering information about a dividend paying stock, 
buying, waiting for a sufficient price rise, and selling. Hence, 
although more general, Ross remarked on the crucial role of 
information. He added, with modern insight, “The greater the 
risk the greater the profit seems like a paradox, but it is gener-
ally true.” The author noted, “A most weighty maxim, verified by 
Wall Street experience, is to ‘cut short losses and let your profits 
run’.” In the end, though, the hope of gain and the fear of loss 
drove the stock market:  “The fluctuations of the stock market 
represent in a great measure a strife between hope and fear.”
SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN THE 1880S
As shown in the previous section, many authors recom-
mended the acquisition of company information, including 
earnings and other accounting information, before investing 
or speculating. This section investigates sources of information 
routinely and readily available. The Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle and Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, the premier source 
for securities, published security descriptors and prices on a 
weekly basis. Poor’s Manual of Railroads of the United States, the 
premier manual for railroads, described railroad physical op-
erations and financial results.12 In addition to these continuing 
of 60 railroad stocks, Grosvenor [1885] reported that prices improved by about 
one third in 1880.
12  Another popular investment journal in the mid-nineteenth century, Ameri-
can Railroad Journal, went out of existence in 1887. Henry V. Poor edited this 
journal for a time. It merged to become The Railroad and Engineering Journal 
10
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sources of information, this study reviews two new information 
sources: Statistics by C. M. Goodsell and The Wall Street Journal. 
These sources were extremely important as investors and specu-
lators did not typically examine available annual reports even as 
late as the 1920s [Lyon, 1926].13
Commercial and Financial Chronicle and Hunt’s Merchants’ 
Magazine (Chronicle): The 1889 Chronicle, like its 1879 issues 
[Thompson, 2011], had three key parts - the weekly issues, the 
monthly “General Quotations of Stocks and Bonds,” and the bi-
monthly Investor’s Supplement [Chronicle, 1889a, b, c, d, e].14 Al-
though the 1889 weekly issues were only slightly longer than those 
in 1879, the Investor’s Supplement grew to about 150 pages from 30. 
The 1889 weekly issues of the Chronicle were better orga-
nized and more thorough than their counterparts were in 1879. 
They began with “Clearing House Returns,” “The Financial Situ-
ation,” and several articles (often on recent railroad earnings). 
Following these, a table provided the highest and lowest monthly 
prices of railroad and other stocks on the NYSE. Economic data 
such as imports, exports, and conditions on Wall Street was of-
fered as well as recent daily or weekly security price information.
Not surprisingly, given the investment advice discussed in 
the previous section, accounting earnings also played a promi-
nent role. One table, “Railroad Earnings,” gave the latest weekly 
or monthly comparative gross earnings for railroads and com-
parative year-to-date results. Figure 1 shows an excerpt from 
the July 6 issue that covered 231 railroads. Subsequent tables 
reported comparative gross earnings for the fourth and third 
weeks of June and the month of June. Another table presented 
comparative monthly and year-to-date gross and net earnings. 
Hence, the Chronicle published several tables of both weekly and 
monthly earnings as soon as possible, updating their previous re-
sults as time passed.15 It also provided one or two annual reports 
[January 1887].  However, it had stopped publishing bond and stock lists in Oc-
tober 1881. 
13  In addition, railroads such as the New York Central in the 1870s and 1880s 
did not always provide annual reports to stockholders [Previts and Merino, 1998].
14  The August - December 1889 issues of the Chronicle were similar. 
15  Neither the state railroad commissions nor the ICC required railroads to pro-
vide monthly data to periodicals. As far back as the 1850s, railroads willingly pro-
vided information directly to periodicals such as Henry V. Poor’s American Railroad 
Journal. Chandler [1956] attributed this willingness to the railroad’s desire for capi-
tal and their need to maintain confidence and value in their securities. Moreover, 
the financial accounting information collected by the state railroad commissions 
and the ICC, at least initially, was annual rather than monthly or weekly [Railroad 
Gazette, 1883; Forty-ninth Congress of the United States of America, 1887].  
11
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followed by “General Investment News” that described individual 
company’s security issues, defaults, mergers, organizations, etc.
FIGURE 1
Railroad Earnings in the Chronicle
Source: Chronicle [1889a, p.19]
The Chronicle also featured security prices. Figures 2 and 3, 
respectively, display portions of the weekly tables of NYSE stock 
and bond prices. Note that for stocks, the Chronicle reported 
shares sold along with daily high and low prices as well as the 
year-to-date price range. For bonds, it presented weekly clos-
ing prices and year-to-date price range. In its third issue of the 
month, the Chronicle provided “General Quotations of Stocks and 
Bonds.” These tables gave bid and ask quotations for a multitude 
of securities (as summarized in Table I), and filled six pages of the 
Chronicle. Investors needed reliable pricing information.
 FIGURE 2
NYSE Stock Prices in the Chronicle
Source: Chronicle [1889c, p.72]
28 
 
igure 1 
Railroad Earnings in the Chronicle 
 
 
 
Source: Chronicle [1889a, p. 19] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Figure 2 
NYSE Stock Prices in the Chronicle 
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FIGURE 3
NYSE Bond Prices in the Chronicle
Source: Chronicle [1889c, p.73]
The Investors’ Supplement contained extensive “Stock and 
Bond Tables” (Figure 4). United States Bonds, State Securi-
ties, and City Securities occupied the beginning of these tables. 
However, most of the Investors’ Supplement concentrated on
railroad securities. Of the 130 pages (out of 150) devoted to 
these in the July 1889 issue, a table (and notes) filled 57 pages 
while railroad maps filled the rest. In contrast, this table was 
only 16 pages in length in 1879 and there were no maps. Note in 
Figure 4 the emphasis on security payments. Extensive supple-
mentary notes took up three-quarters of each page. Though 
briefer than the information in Poor’s Manual, they were some-
what similar and described attributes of bond issues as well as 
foreclosures and reorganizations. Other tables addressed canal, 
bank, and other issues.
FIGURE 4
Stock and Bond Tables in the Investors' Supplement
Source: Chronicle [1889e, p.14]
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The Investors’ Supplement in September and November 
[Chronicle, 1889f, g] essentially followed July’s format. However, 
these issues also reported “Monthly Earnings of Principal Rail-
roads” for about 58 railroads, presenting gross earnings (rev-
enues). Figure 5 exhibits part of this table. Overall, the Investors’ 
Supplement supplied comprehensive pricing, gross and net earn-
ings, and other information.  
FIGURE 5
Monthly Earnings of Principal Railroads in the
Investors' Supplement
Source: Chronicle [1889e, p.150]
Manual of the Railroads of the United States (Manual): In its 
twenty-second year, over a thousand pages of Poor’s [1889] mas-
sive volume provided information on individual railroads in the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico. It also included supplemen-
tal information on “auxiliary” companies (e.g., communication 
companies such as Western Union Telegraph Co. and American 
Bell Telephone Co.) as well as appendices on states’ debts and 
liabilities, dividends, other railroads (e.g., street), and railroad 
commissioners and officers. Twenty-one regional foldout maps 
showed railroad routes.
The introduction comprised numerous tables and commen-
tary. Significantly, Poor presented operating results for railroads 
covering about 145,000 miles of the 154,000 miles of track com-
pleted by the latest fiscal year end, with most of the difference 
due to the fact that not all newly constructed track was yet in 
operation. In other words, unlike the 1879 Manual [Poor, 1879], 
Poor obtained financial information from most railroads. This 
could have been due to the influence of the newly formed ICC 
as well as greater diligence on the part of the older state railroad 
commissions. 
32 
 
Figure 5 
Monthly Earnings of Principal Railroads in the Investors’ Supplement 
 
 
 
Source: Chronicle [1889e, p. 150]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 40 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol40/iss2/4
69Thompson, Railroad Investing
In the introduction, Poor provided overall results and 
regional breakdowns of track mileage, operating data, bal-
ance sheet accounts, and income information. Interestingly, 
the “Comparative Statement” for each of the years from 1883 
through 1888 gave various per mile calculations for the overall 
rail system such as capital stock per mile of completed road and 
freight earnings per mile of road in operation. Also included 
were operating data such as average distance per passenger and 
average haul per ton. Tables included freight and freight rates, 
passengers and passenger rates, rolling stock, and types of rails. 
Poor also commented on railroad issues such as the wisdom of 
recent expansions given the decline in railroad rates and divi-
dends; so he did not restrict himself to merely presenting facts.
The main purpose of the Manual was to provide physical 
operating and financial information on individual railroads. 
Illustrative of the longer entries is the one for the New York Cen-
tral and Hudson River Railroad Company. Exhibit A, organized 
by subheadings, lists most of the types of information presented. 
Especially noteworthy, are the number of per mile calculations 
such as earnings, debt, and passengers. These allowed ready 
comparisons between railroads.16 Hence, Poor did not just 
collect and present accounting and other data, but included 
analyses. In addition to the information described in Exhibit A, 
he gave data on the “allotment” of expenses to passengers and 
freight, the number of employees, wages, the percent of wages 
to total expenses, annual stockholders’ meeting date, dates for 
opening and closing books for the annual meeting and divi-
dends, and where the stock and bonds were listed.
EXHIBIT A
Poor's Entry for the New York Central and Hudson River 
Railroad Company
Main line of road: terminus and distance of lines (main, 
branch, leased); gauge and rail types.
History: lease terms, acquisitions of more recent lines, reference 
for prior history, track mileage table (main and additional); steel 
and iron track mileage.
Rolling and Floating stock: numbers of engines, cars, ships, 
and barges.
16  Balfour [1848] made railroad per mile calculations. They also appeared in 
the Baltimore and Ohio Annual Report for 1848 [Previts and Samson, 2000]. 
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Operations (year ending Sept. 30, 1888): gross earnings (pas-
senger, freight, and four other types), expenses (maintenance 
of way, transportation, and four other types), net earnings, pay-
ments (interest, dividends, and three other types), and surplus 
for the year; adjustments to surplus, total surplus; per mile 
amounts for gross earnings, expenses, and net earnings.
General Balance Sheet (Sept. 30, 1888): Assets (cost of road 
and equipment and six other accounts) and Liabilities (capital 
stock, funded debt, and nine other accounts); schedule of stocks 
and bonds of other companies including dividends or interest 
received.
Summary of Financial Transactions (current year): Resources 
(cash balance at beginning of year, surplus for the year, issues of 
stocks and bonds, and two other amounts) and Appropriations 
of Resources (construction accounts, three other amounts, and 
cash balance at year-end).
Statement of Capital Account (1870 through 1888): capital 
stock, funded debt, cost of road and equipment, number of 
stockholders, and miles of track operated; statement of funded 
debt at September 30, 1888 including the average funded debt 
per mile of road and details of debt.
Statement of operations, capital account, etc. (1882 through 
1888): railroad and track mileage, rolling stock, balance sheet 
information, per mile amounts for gross earnings, expenses, and 
net earnings, and percentage of expenses to gross earnings.
Leased lines: date of lease, road miles, track miles, stock, 
bonds, cost of roads, rental payments (interest, dividends, state 
tax, and organization expenses).
Other tables: mileage (e.g., passenger trains) with averages 
(e.g., passengers per train mile), freight (e.g., moved one mile, 
profit per freight train mile), earnings (gross, etc.,) with calcula-
tions (profit per passenger train mile), freight descriptions (type, 
tons, and percentage).
Railroads leased and owned: history, terms of agreements, and 
some financial information.
Other: board of directors, officers, principal office.
Source: Poor [1889]
Figure 6, showing the table for the subheading “Statement 
16
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of operations, capital account, etc,” demonstrates the extensive 
comparative details provided by Poor. Note the various per mile 
calculations and the ratio of expenses to earnings reported at 
the bottom of the table. Again, such calculations enabled com-
parisons among railroads.    
FIGURE 6
Poor's Statement of Operations for the New York Central
 & Hudson River
Source: Poor [1889, p.196]
The entry for the New York Central in the 1889 Manual 
(nine pages) was almost twice as long as the entry in the 1879 
Manual, including a greater number of tables covering more 
years. The earlier entry gave an extended history of the railroad, 
but, unlike the 1889 entry, described the leased lines under 
their own headings. In 1889, the entry included a “Summary of 
34 
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Financial Transactions,” essentially a cash flow statement, and 
more averages such as “average number of miles each passenger 
carried.”17
Other longer entries were similar to that for the New York 
Central, generally differing in only the extent of details pro-
vided. Occasionally, additional information presented included 
the changes in the income account, cost of maintenance, and a 
multi-year table on capital structure as for the New York, Lake 
Erie and Western.
Shorter entries in Poor’s 1889 Manual were very similar in 
organization, though usually more detailed than those of the 
1879 Manual. Headings included main line of road, history, roll-
ing stock, operations, financial statement, and directors. The 
caption of “history” was new, but Poor had presented a brief his-
tory under “line of road” in the earlier Manual. Poor added the 
annual meeting date and sometimes the listing exchange and 
registrar.
There were fewer entries in the 1889 Manual than in the 
1879 Manual due to the consolidation of railroad systems in 
the 1880s and a change in the Manual’s organization; leased or 
operated lines were included under the heading of the operating 
railroad rather than separately. Poor’s Manual continued to be 
the quintessential source of railroad information of the time.        
Statistics: Statistics by C. M. Goodsell [1883] was a collection 
of financial data on railroads and other companies along with 
economic data on commodity prices, bank information, exports 
and imports, and public debt. This annual volume was a part 
of a series that eventually became The Manual of Statistics run-
ning from 1879 into the 1920s. The 1883 volume was the oldest 
conveniently obtainable.18 With respect to railroads, Goodsell 
intended [pp. 124-125] “to present the latest attainable informa-
tion in a condensed form, uniting brevity and clearness.” The 
railroad information was from company and State Commis-
sion reports with some numbers adjusted “owing to obscure 
or vicious methods of accounts”19 Goodsell made a special ef-
fort to provide the most recent information, especially for the 
17  Other railroads had reported what were essentially cash flow statements 
earlier and some had transitioned to a working capital funds flow statement by 
the 1880s [Boockholdt, 1978].
18  No library could be located that had the initial 1879 edition.
19  Goodsell does not explain what he meant by “vicious.” For the most part, 
states that required annual reports from railroads made their own rules. Appar-
ently, Goodsell took exception to some of the formats/methods.
18
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tardy reports from New York. The author proudly stated his data 
“brought up to a year later than can be found in Poor’s Manual, 
or any other reliable publication.”20 Obviously, more timely in-
formation benefited railroad investors. 
About two-thirds of the 184 pages in this volume covered 
individual railroads. The entries were relatively brief with only 
9% of the railroads allotted more than one page. Exhibit B is the 
New York Central and Hudson River Railroad entry. Included 
are terminus and length, rolling stock, stock, funded debt, earn-
ings, and disposition of net earnings. Observe the conciseness 
of this entry compared to that of Poor’s [1889]. However, unlike 
Poor, Goodsell did not include any per mile calculations or other 
ratios.  
EXHIBIT B
Reproduction of Goodsell's Entry for New York Central 
& Hudson River
Road owned, New York to Buffalo, 442 miles; branches, 307 
miles; leased and chiefly owned, 110 miles; leased, 134 miles; to-
tal worked, 993 miles.  There are 508 miles of second track, 316 
miles third track, and 296 miles fourth track.  Locomotives, 646; 
passenger cars, 588; freight cars, 22,465.
Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $89, 428,300
Funded Debt.
Premium Bonds, 6 per cent., 1883 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $6,632,300
Bonds of 1854, 6 per cent., 1883 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74,500
Bonds of 1853, 6 per cent., 1883 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592,000
Real estate bonds, 6 per cent., 1883 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162,000
Renewal bonds, 6 per cent., 1887 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,391,000
Hudson River 2d mort., 7 per cent., 1885 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,492,900
New mort., 7 per cent., 1903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,465,000
   “      “      6 per cent., 1903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   14,733,333
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $48,473,033
Annual interest charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,847,261
Last dividend, 2 per cent., quarterly, January 15, 1883. 
Regular dividends (8 per cent. yearly) are paid.
There were $5,000,000 new bonds issued last year and the 
proceeds applied to permanent improvements.
20  The New York Commission was not only slow in providing information, 
they were not required to share information on a railroad’s condition or manage-
ment unless they thought it served a public interest [Railroad Gazette, 1883]. 
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Earnings
Year ending Sept. 30.
 Gross. Net.
1878-79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $28,398,584    $12,273,511
1879-80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,175,913 15,320,019
1880-81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,348,397      12,883,610
1881-82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,628,781      11,232,807
All miscellaneous receipts are included in earnings. The dis-
position of net earnings was as follows:
  Dividends
 Net earnings. Charges. Surplus. Amount Pr. ct.
1878-79 . . . $12,273,511 $4,679,025 $7,594,486 $7,139,528  8
1879-80 . . . . 15,326,019 4,756,799 10,569,220 7,141,513 8
1880-81 . . . . 12,883,610 4,990,783 7,892,827 7,138,344 8
1881-82 . . . . 11,232,807 5,488,903 5,743,904 7,145,513 8
In 1881-82 the dividends paid exceeded the surplus by 
$1,401,609, leaving a deficit to that amount.
Source: Goodsell [1883, pp. 71-72]
The entries for the other railroads were similar though 
typically shorter with less than four years of data or earnings 
information included with the leasing railroad’s results. For 
many companies, a single table gave all the earnings informa-
tion under the headings gross, net, charges, and surplus. A sen-
tence stated the percentage of any dividends. Notes on capital 
structure covered items such as interest payments by receivers 
and their plans while notes on earnings discussed issues such as 
reasons for a deficit.
A few entries had information on non-railroad companies 
including Wells, Fargo Express Co., Western Union Telegraph 
Company, and coal and mining companies. Goodsell published 
far less information for companies outside of railroads.  
In summary, for the dominant industry of the time, Good-
sell provided information for railroads including route, rolling 
stock, capital structure, and earnings.21 He emphasized concise-
21  In 1889, Henry Wallace took over this work after the death of Goodsell. 
Wallace expanded the work to include up to ten years of earnings data as well 
as additional information on gross earnings per mile, expenses as a percent of 
gross earnings, net earnings per mile, maps, and administration such as name 
of officers [Janson and Thompson, 2005]. This expanded volume with 241 pages 
devoted to railroads was still far shorter than Poor’s Manual. 
20
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ness and up-to-date information. Goodsell also presented annual 
price range information for both stocks and bonds, something 
apparently not readily available.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ): Volume I, No. 1 of the WSJ 
appeared on Monday, July 8, 1889. An editorial explained [WSJ, 
1889a, p. 3] that “Its object is to give fully and fairly the daily 
news attending the fluctuations in prices of stocks, bonds and 
some classes of commodities.” It focused on news, not opinions, 
with “a faithful picture of the rapidly shifting panorama of the 
Street” along with “the events which have moved or are moving 
prices, together with the drift of opinion in the Street.” The edi-
torial also referred to Dow Jones & Co. news service that began 
in November 1882. It had correspondents in major cities in the 
United States and Europe that provided news to New York by 
telegraph. Dow Jones & Co.’s “fundamental principles” were “To 
get the news. To publish it instantly, whether bull or bear.” The 
overriding policy was “to have the news always honest, intelli-
gent and unprejudiced.”
The first article in the first issue of the WSJ, “Average Move-
ment of Prices,” reported the average price of 12 stocks along 
with the turning points since July 2, 1885. A daily feature, 
subsequent editions typically placed this column later in the 
paper. The next article, “The Market To-Day,” discussed general 
trends as well as specific events. For example, it claimed that 
bear traders had sent sell orders to London to depress the prices 
of American securities before the New York market opened and 
that New York bankers were pressuring the railroads to settle 
their differences.  The “Market To-Day” column became the lead 
article starting on July 10 [WSJ, 1889c].
The following describes those columns published during 
1889 that focused upon financial accounting and corporate 
securities. Security prices were a daily feature showing the 
familiar opening, high, low, and closing prices. In the “General 
List” for stocks from July 12 [WSJ, 1889e], all but two of the 30 
stocks appear to be railroads with the exceptions being Chicago 
Gas and Western Union. This list grew to 45 active stocks by the 
end of the year [WSJ, 1889q]. There were three “Unlisted” stocks 
at the end of the list. The WSJ also published total shares traded. 
“Bond Quotations” included almost all bonds listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange, excluding those that were inactive. 
Similar to today, the table from July 12 [WSJ, 1889e] reported 
maturity date, last prices, and yield-to-maturity, a ready method 
of comparing bonds. It contained about 320 bonds, growing to 
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over 400 bonds by year-end.
“Railroad Net Earnings” presented the most recent year-to-
date results along with the changes. Figure 7 shows three rail-
roads for the Jan. 1 to June 30, 1889 period. Additional railroads 
were reported under the Jan. 1 to May 31 and Jan. 1 to April 30 
headings. In all, the column covered about 50 railroads, with a 
similar number covered at year-end.
FIGURE 7
Railroad Net Earnings in the WSJ
Source: WSJ [1889e, p.4]
Starting on July 9 [WSJ, 1889b], the WSJ often printed 
“Railroad Earnings” showing comparative earnings for various 
periods (week, month, or quarter) and their increase or decrease 
from the prior period. Figure 8 displays “Railroad Earnings” 
from July 11. A column on “Railroad Fixed Charges” reported 
annual payments such as interest, taxes, and rents (Figure 9). 
The introductory note stated that with these fixed charges and 
the net earnings for these railroads, “calculations can be readily 
made,” apparently alluding to a margin of safety type calcula-
tion. “Dividends and Dates” first appeared on July 31 (Figure 
10). Presumably, “Books Close” and “Books Open” warned of 
ex-dividend dates. The WSJ also publicized companies seek-
ing listing in “Applications to the List.” It published “Transfer 
Offices” (stock transfer agents) and various analyses of price 
changes including “Movement of Stocks” [WSJ, 1889k], “Decline 
in Stocks” [WSJ, 1889l], and “Twelve active stocks yesterday” 
[WSJ, 1889m].
36 
 
Figure 7 
Railroad Net Earnings in the WSJ 
 
 
Source: WSJ [1889e, p. 4] 
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FIGURE 8
Railroad Earnings in the WSJ
Source: WSJ [1889d, p.1]
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Figure 8 
Railroad Earnings in the WSJ 
Source: WSJ [1889d, p. 1] 
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FIGURE 9
Railroad Fixed Charges in the WSJ
Source: WSJ [1889f, p.3]
38 
 
Figure 9 
Railroad Fixed Charges in the WSJ 
 
 
 
Source: WSJ [1889f, p. 3] 
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FIGURE 10
Dividends and Dates in the WSJ
Source: WSJ [1889g, p.3]
The “Average Movement of Prices” column changed to “The 
Course of the Market” on September 24 [WSJ, 1889j]. For over 
a year, the WSJ based average prices on 12 stocks. However, in 
response to criticisms that this was too small a number to be 
meaningful, the WSJ expanded the average to 20 stocks. Not 
only did the two averages have essentially the same turning 
points, so did an average comprised of most of the stocks on the 
NYSE. The 12 companies in the averages, comprised of ten rail-
39 
 
Figure 10 
Dividends and Dates in the WSJ 
Source: WSJ [1889g, p. 3] 
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roads, one telegraph company, and a steamship company, were: 
• St. Paul 
• Lake Shore 
• Northwest  
• New York Central 
• Lackawanna 
• Delaware & Hudson 
• Northern Pacific preferred 
• Western Union 
• Union Pacific 
• Pacific Mail 
• Missouri Pacific 
• Louisville & Nashville
Eight additional railroads were included in the average of 20: 
Canadian Pacific, Omaha common, Oregon Transcontinental, 
Richmond Terminal, Kansas & Pacific, Erie, Texas Pacific, and 
Jersey Central.
“The Market To-Day” column on December 10 [WSJ, 1889n] 
analyzed the 12 stocks in the average. It reported their respec-
tive prices on December 7, 1886, the dollar amount of their 
decline in prices through April 2, 1888, and the dollar amount 
of their recovery to December 7, 1889. It concluded that [p. 1] 
“This table shows how merit controls prices in the long run.” A 
brief synopsis followed for some of the companies that reflected 
stock analysis thinking of the time. Louisville & Nashville and 
Northern Pacific increased in value since December 7, 1886 be-
cause they started paying dividends while St. Paul declined since 
it stopped paying dividends. Similarly, Lake Shore increased in 
value as it paid an extra dividend and had accumulated surplus. 
Delaware & Hudson increased because of retiring bonds. On the 
other hand, New York Central declined due to its acquisition of 
West Shore, Missouri Pacific because it might need reorganiza-
tion, and Pacific Mail since it was not “active.”22 Consequently, 
the WSJ advised stock investors to (p. 1) “find properties not too 
22  The WSJ did not provide further details. New York Central  likely had  too 
much capacity as the West Shore line paralleled the original New York Central 
line, Missouri Pacific probably had excessive debt, and Pacific Mail had not paid 
a dividend since 1885 [Poor, 1889].
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high, of real merit and likely to be situated so as to be able to ex-
hibit that merit a little later.” Buffet [2001] gives similar advice.
The WSJ also frequently published financial and other 
results for individual companies. Figure 11 displays the results 
for New York Central that included more information than for 
most companies. In addition to a straightforward comparative 
income statement of sorts (including dividends), the column 
also presented information on freight and passengers, changes 
in funded debt, floating debt, and other selected asset and li-
ability accounts, dividends and interest received (apparently not 
included on its income statement), and payroll.
FIGURE 11
New York Central in the WSJ
Source: WSJ [1889p, p.1]
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Figure 11 
New York entral in the WSJ 
 
 
 
Source: WSJ [1889p, p. 1] 
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Contrast New York Central’s income statement with the one 
reported for St. Paul given in Figure 12. Note that after “net,” 
St. Paul included “other income,” “interest,” and “old accounts 
charged off.” Clearly, generally accepted accounting principles 
were lacking. The column also calculated earnings and surplus 
as a percentage of common stock (apparently book value), an 
early example of ratio analysis.23
FIGURE 12
St. Paul in the WSJ
Source: WSJ [1889i, p.2]
The article for Western Union (Figure 13) gave quarterly 
information (partly estimated). Again, observe the calculation of 
23  Stow [1859] made similar ratio calculations in his short-lived railroad man-
ual.
41 
 
Figure 12 
St. Paul in the WSJ 
Source: WSJ [1889i, p. 2] 
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the ratio of earnings to stock, for both the quarter and year. The 
final sentence stated, “The surplus is expended on the property 
each year, and is capitalized occasionally.” Apparently, surplus 
absorbed certain property (presumably, equipment and rail-
road) payments. In turn, the company sometimes increased the 
recorded value of property, although the offsetting increase is 
unclear (capital stock through stock watering?).
FIGURE 13
Western Union in the WSJ
Source: WSJ [1889h, p.1]
42 
 
Figure 13 
Western Union in the WSJ 
Source: WSJ [1889h, p. 1] 
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Interestingly, the lead article on December 13 [WSJ, 1889o] 
published the financial results for Missouri Pacific. The source 
of this official statement was not the “Kansas report,” referring 
to the tardiness of the Kansas Railway Commission in providing 
reports to the public.  
Thus, the WSJ played a role in disseminating company 
financial information. This not only included comparative 
earnings information, but also balance sheet amounts as well. 
Among these were comparative analyses of both funded debt 
and floating (short-term) debt. It also reported various ratios 
including earnings or surplus as a percentage of common stock 
along with traditional calculations such as freight rates per mile. 
This reflected growth in the sophistication of financial analysis.
RAILROAD INVESTMENT PRACTICES OF THE 1880S IN 
PERSPECTIVE
Elements of railroad investment practices of the 1880s ap-
pear in the more advanced analyses developed later. For exam-
ple, Earling [1890], in his primarily qualitative work, considered 
the ability of companies to pay their floating debt an important 
theme. Woodlock [1895] also emphasized floating debt, but 
added some quantitative analyses such as net earnings per mile 
and the operating ratio of operating expenses to gross earnings 
to gauge whether a railroad capitalized operating expenses as 
assets [Janson and Thompson, 2005]. As shown, in the 1880s 
publications reported floating debt, various per mile calcula-
tions, and the operating ratio.  
Selden [1913] and Escher [1914] also espoused the benefits 
of the operating ratio and net earnings as a percentage of stock 
value, the same as the WSJ. Furthermore, they quantified the 
margin of safety as excess of net earnings over interest pay-
ments (recall Davis & Co. and WSJ’s suggestions of comparing 
earnings to fixed charges) and dividend yield (dividends as a 
percentage of stock prices). Malkiel [2007] noted the continued 
importance in bond investing of yield-to-maturity reported in 
the WSJ. Others like Clay [1915] classified the riskiness of secu-
rities based on the relative value of pledged assets to the amount 
of a bond issue. Again, 1880s financial periodicals prominently 
reported these measures or their components such as dividends 
and stock prices.  
Similarly, the common advice from the 1880s of buying stock 
of dividend payers persisted into the next century and beyond. 
Seyler [1919], for example, recommended buying dividend pay-
30
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 40 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol40/iss2/4
85Thompson, Railroad Investing
ers subject to his danger signals such as companies not providing 
financial statements.  Cramer [2005] claims that the best invest-
ments over the long-term are high quality dividend paying stocks.
By the 1880s, railroad investment considerations required 
knowledge of earnings. Clews [1887] included railroad earnings 
as part of his external factor affecting the stock market. Many 
other advisors of the 1880s commented on the importance of 
railroad earnings and other financial information in making 
investment and speculation decisions. Earnings mattered. They 
still do; as Cramer states [2006, p. 30]: “value companies based 
on their earnings, their future expected earnings, and their 
growth.”  
Each of these authors, past and present, needed reliable 
financial accounting information. However, the information 
in the 1880s lacked standardization. As early as 1873, Vernon 
[1873] wanted better rules for determining operating expenses 
for railroads. Perhaps, this also bothered Goodsell in his refer-
ence to “vicious” accounting methods. Moreover, as shown, the 
income statements in the WSJ in 1889 used a variety of formats. 
Woodlock [1895] complained about not only the lack of compa-
rability between railroads, but also the lack of consistency for 
the same railroad over time. However, as mentioned, the ICC 
grappled with standardization, but failed to achieve it until the 
passage of the Hepburn Act in 1906. Improvements in generally 
accepted accounting principles for general corporate reporting 
awaited the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the subsequently developed financial reporting rule-
making bodies such as the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
and its successors.
Investors wanted timely information and the newer sources 
were timelier than Poor’s Manual and the weekly Chronicle. 
Goodsell’s Statistics prided itself on more up-to-date information 
than Poor’s. The WSJ gave stock market results on a daily basis. 
It also employed telegraph correspondents around the country 
and in Europe to provide breaking news. 
In the 1880s, Poor’s Manual published the most compre-
hensive railroad information. It covered both physical operating 
and financial information, sometimes in calculations with each 
other.24 The Chronicle presented the most thorough security 
24  The Quincy Mining Company included non-financial operating data in their 
annual reports in the 19th century, but abandoned the practice [Michael, 1996]. 
The AICPA’s Special Committee on Financial Reporting [1994] recently revived 
the idea of reporting non-financial operating data. 
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pricing information and earnings reports. Goodsell in Statistics 
focused on a railroad’s capital structure, earnings, interest and 
dividend payments, and surplus.
Less systematically, but more frequently, the WSJ provided 
railroad information. This information went beyond earnings to 
include comparative analyses of floating debt and other balance 
sheet amounts. It also sometimes published novel ratios such 
as net earnings as a percent of common stock in addition to the 
traditional calculations of freight and passenger rates per mile. 
The WSJ periodically included columns on company earnings, 
dividends, and fixed charges.
In summary, railroad investment advice and the amount 
and frequency of readily available information grew in the 
1880s. Yet, market participants had to be leery of insiders and 
other manipulators, misleading newspaper articles, small mar-
gins, trading too frequently, and buying high and selling low. As 
earlier, a rigged casino atmosphere continued to prevail in the 
stock market. Nevertheless, publications made strides inform-
ing investors and speculators as to what they were buying. The 
financial accounting and other information published by Poor in 
his Manual, the Chronicle, Goodsell in Statistics, and Dow Jones 
in the WSJ helped meet investors’ needs for information to make 
rational decisions.
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